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Glossary of Terms  
Below is a list of common terms that are used throughout my thesis. This page will serve as a 
reference for some terms, but these definitions are not complete by any means. These definitions 
serve to orient the reader, not explain the entirety of the terminology in a few sentences.  
 
• Nation: A collection of people united by their belonging to the ‘imagined community’ as 
theorized by Benedict Anderson.  
• Nationalism: Identification with an ‘imagined community’ of members who share 
similar experiences, histories and myths. Produces an ‘other,’ and can be utilized as a 
mobilizing ideology.  
• Sahrawi: The indigenous population that inhabits the surrounding area of Western 
Sahara. Sahrawis consider themselves to be ethnically different than Moroccans and do 
not speak the same dialect.  
• Green March: On November 6th, 1975 Morocco ‘peacefully’ invaded Western Sahara 
with civilians carrying Qurans, Moroccan Flags, and photographs of King Hassan II.  
• Black March: How Sahrawis label the Green March, indicating the bad intentions and 
subsequent military invasion that occurred in the Northwestern part of Western Sahara. 
• Madrid Accords: Following the Green March, Mauritania, Morocco and Spain signed a 
treaty essentially removing Spain from Western Sahara and instead giving the land to 
Morocco and Mauritania, with Spain maintaining some economic profits from the local 
industries. Sahrawis were strategically not included in the Accords.  
• The Berm: A military sand wall that divides Western Sahara into the Occupied 
Territories and SADR. Created by the Moroccan Military from 1981-1987, the Berm is 
comprised of six separate military walls.  
• King Hassan II: The Moroccan Monarch from 1961 until 1999. Son of Mohammed V. 
Calls for the Green March of 1975.  
• Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR/ RASD): Government and State of the 
Sahrawis since 1976. Official member of the African Union.   
• Front Polisario: Sahrawi liberation and resistance movement founded in 1973 in 
opposition to colonialism. Works under the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, 
headquartered in Tindouf refugee camps.  
• Settler Colonialism: An overarching structure of domination rather than a singular 
event, as theorized by Patrick Wolfe and Lorenzo Veracini. Goal is the elimination of the 
native and replacement with settlers.  
• Colonialism: Process of obtaining control over another population for the purposes of  
exploitation.  
• Irredentism: an ideology that a territory must be restored to its previous boundaries. 
Historical restoration claims.  
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Chronology of the Region 
 
1502   Spanish land in Western Sahara    
1524  Area surrounding al-Daklha/Villa Cisneros informally returned to Saadian  
  rulers  
1884  The Congress of Berlin resulting with European powers dividing Africa 
1884  Capitan Emilio Bonelli Hernado reconquered Villa Cisneros and    
  established a military fortress, La Factoria 
1936  Communist prisoners from the Spanish Civil War are transported to live in  
  Villa Cisneros  
1947  Spanish civilians begin settling in Villa Cisneros  
1947  Bou Craa phosphate reserves were discovered, but not officially mined yet  
1960  Global decolonization period as dictated by the United Nations  
1963  Sand War between Algeria and Morocco over border claims  
1973  Establishment of the Front Polisario  
1974  Bou Craa mining operation begins to boom 
1975  Moroccan Military invades the Northeast corner of Western Sahara on   
  October 31st 
1975  The Green March, ‘officially’ occurring November 6th    
1975  The Madrid Accords on November 14th  
1976  Morocco Napalm bombs camps in Western Sahara, Amalga.  
1976  Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), Republique arab sahraoui   
  democratique (RASD) is declared    
1979  Mauritania withdraws claims to Western Sahara, SADR only fighting   
  Morocco for territorial claims  
1980  Morocco begins the first wall construction of the Berm 
1987  Morocco completes the sixth section of the Berm  
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“I’m indigenous, this is my land and I have been here for hundreds of years” Mansour 
pronounced as the skype screen crackled.1 Pride and determination were laced throughout his 
words. This quotation could be placed into multiple different geographies and contexts, most 
commonly associated with Native American tribal claims and Palestinian territorial assertions; 
however, this assertion came from a local Sahrawi, an indigenous person from the contested 
region of Western Sahara. Mansour is a Sahrawi living in the Western Sahara capital city of 
Laayoune (El Aaiun), a city currently under Moroccan occupation. Mansour, his family and 
many local members in the community continue to make indigeneity and sovereignty claims to 
their homeland by mobilizing members in opposition of colonialism, specifically countering 
Moroccan settler colonialism in their homeland. Often overlooked on an international scale, 
Western Sahara has been cited as ‘Africa’s last colony,’ and remains to be a highly contested site 
in terms of administrative power, physical warfare, and livelihood.  
Mansour’s citation references the longevity of his family history in the region but 
because of Moroccan historic and contemporary rule, Mansour and his family are deprived of 
their homeland.  While it is globally recognized that Spain dominated Western Sahara’s colonial 
past, this thesis will argue that after Spanish forces left the region in 1975, instead of 
experiencing liberation, Western Sahara became a site of Moroccan settler colonialism that was 
enacted through the means of nationalist rhetoric. In order to make this argument, the connection 
of nationalism and settler colonial theory will be applied to specific sites of Moroccan colonial 
power. Specifically, this thesis will examine how Moroccan nationalist rhetoric has framed the 
settler colonial situation as a nationalist crusade.  
                                               
1 Mansour is a pseudonym from a Sahrawi I have been communicating with. For the purposes of his security and 
Yale IRB exemption, his real name will remain unknown and instead will be referenced as Mansour.   
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Western Sahara, or depending on what maps you are referencing, Moroccan Sahara, the 
Southern Provinces, and/or the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR/ RASD), is a 
disputed territory located to the south of Morocco along the Atlantic coast (Fig I). The map 
below visually depicts the proximity of Western Sahara to the Canary Islands, Morocco, Algeria, 
and Mauritania. The latter three countries play foundational roles in the history and fate of the 
indigenous Sahrawi people. The current and historical situations in Western Sahara are both 
rooted in colonialism and the relationship between European powers and local African leaders of 
ambiguously defined territories. The definition of and creation of boundaries are a result of 
Figure I: Map of Western Sahara with Spanish influence 
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previous colonial mapping practices and projects. Fig. I explicitly highlights the role of colonial 
powers, specifically Spain, as the towns and provinces are written in the colonial language, 
Spanish. This explicit strategy is apparent with the decision to label the Northern province Rio de 
Oro, meaning ‘River of Gold’ in Spanish, instead of designating its Arabic name, Oued Ed-
Dahab. It is notable that this map specifically places a strong border line between Western 
Sahara and Morocco, articulating the political lean of the map creator.  
Mapping, when analyzed as a practice, is a tool of empire as it actively dictates who is 
included and excluded, typically determined through the lens of economic value rather than by 
natural divisions and collective identity. The legacy of colonialism expressed through active 
mapping practices in the region implicates several separate empires, notably, Spain, Mauritania 
and Morocco, making Western Sahara a palimpsest: a site of historic and present colonial 
practices building on top of each other. This thesis will present several different maps that 
display the deliberate effects of mapping on indigenous populations and the nationalistic 
processes behind mapping.  
 To locate Western Sahara in a political realm it is necessary to comprehend which pieces 
of land mass are controlled by the Moroccan government versus which areas are controlled by 
the self-proclaimed nation of Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR)/ République arabe 
Figure II: Four Different Ways to Show Western Sahara and the powers controlling the specific regions 
     
 
Taheri 8 
sahraoui démocratique (RASD). Figure II illustrates the four most common ways to actively map 
the region. The first map on the left side depicts two separate nations, Morocco in red and 
Western Sahara in green. The hard border line emphasizes the sovereignty of each party, whereas 
the second map presents a dotted line indicating the disputed nature of the territory. The green 
coloring indicates the presence and desires of indigenous people to mobilize behind 
SADR/RASD. The third map exhibits the political situation in Western Sahara since 1975. The 
boundary where the red region, under Moroccan control, meets the green region, RASD, is 
explicitly cut by the location of the Berm, a massive wall dividing the region. In the red region 
lie the phosphate mines and fish-rich waters.2 Lastly, the fourth map shows how the Moroccan 
state views the Southern Provinces; fully integrated as part of Morocco. These maps introduce 
the geography through different nationalistic lenses.  
Politically, the region of Western Sahara underwent regime changes in 1975 that led to 
the forceful displacement of the majority of Sahrawis due to Moroccan military force. A vast 
number of Sahrawis who were displaced from the Moroccan invasion currently still live in 
massive refugee camps outside of Western Sahara. The most notable agglomeration of camps are 
in the Algerian Tindouf province, located to the Northeast of Western Sahara.3 The exodus to the 
refugee camps was a direct product of displacement by the Moroccan military and settler 
colonial campaigns conducted after the Green March and signing of the Madrid Accords of 
1975. Some Sahrawis even cite this experience as similar in memory to the offensive that 
produced the al-Nakba in Palestine.4 This correlation between the traumatic exoduses of 
indigenous populations accentuates the collective experiences settler colonial structures have had 
                                               
2 Alicia Campos-Serrano and José Antonio Rodríguez-Esteban, "Imagined Territories and Histories in Conflict 
during the Struggles for Western Sahara, 1956–1979," Journal of Historical Geography 55 (2017): accessed April 
07, 2019, doi:10.1016/j.jhg.2016.11.009. 
3 Alice Wilson, Sovereignty in Exile: A Saharan Liberation Movement Governs, Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2016. 
4 Mansour, interviewed by Amanda Taheri, February 2, 2019.  
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on indigenous identity. Generations of Sahrawis have been living in refugee camps, with most of 
the younger generations having never actually visited and lived in their real homeland of 
Western Sahara, yet, through the national imaginary they are able to maintain a sense of 
nationalistic belonging. Sahrawis extended stay in these camps for over forty years and the 
inability to easily return to their homeland is partially a product of the militarized maintenance of 
the Berm, a 2,700 km wall laced with landmines, a physical exemplification of Morocco utilizing 
map making as a tool of reinforcing empire and militarizing this structure to further emphasize 
their colonial dominance.    
The field of settler colonial theory typically operates through an Anglo-oriented lens 
when determining the application of settler colonial theory to a geography. There exists a 
substantial gap in the literature as there are few cases where the terminology is administered to 
‘non-Western’ actors’ colonial activities, dovetailing with Edward Said’s notion of Orientalism. 
This thesis will expand the seemingly skewed and biased application of settler colonial theory to 
incorporate the Moroccan government’s military and civilian actions that have promoted, and 
continue to, the structures of settler colonialism in the disputed region of Western Sahara. It is 
possible that the lack of international awareness and reporting on Western Sahara is a result of a 
disconnect between settler colonial theory and its application to the territory. It is also plausible 
that the lack of settler colonial literature surrounding the region has led international actors, like 
the United States and France, to continue to financially and militarily support Morocco, 
indirectly promoting a settler colonial campaign. It is with this understanding that I approach this 
thesis as a forum to expose Moroccan colonial actions in Western Sahara that have occurred, and 
are still ongoing, with the aspiration of adding to the settler colonial scholarship and awareness 
of  the situation in Western Sahara.  
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For the purposes of conciseness, this essay will focus on a specific time period of the 
conflict: November 1973 to April 1987. These dates encompass prominent institutional and 
physical alterations that occurred during the conflict, particularly the founding of the Front 
Polisario/Frente Popular para la liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y Rio de Oro in 1973, the Green 
March of 1975 which led to the Madrid Accords (1975) and finally the construction of the last 
section of  the Berm in 1987. While these events and periods of history will serve as the basis for 
this paper, it is essential to comprehend some historic precursors to the conflict, particularly the 
relationship between Algeria and Morocco and a separate relationship between Morocco and 
Spain. Bred from colonial legacies and irredentist claims, the 1963 Sand War erupted between 
Algeria and Morocco over border disputes.5 The motives of this war, mainly irredentist claims, 
largely mirror the rationales behind the resurgence of conflict between Algeria and Morocco in 
1976.6 This political tension between Morocco and Algeria has further played out in the Western 
Sahara question and oftentimes intertwines with claims that Algeria is aiding and harboring 
supporters of a ‘terrorist’ group in the refugee camps, referring to Sahrawis who support the 
Front Polisario, and on the flipside, that Morocco is a colonizing power. Ultimately, the conflict 
in the region has prohibited individuals like Mansour, who come from generations of native, 
nomadic families from accessing their own homeland in its true, liberated form. The current state 
of contestation in Western Sahara is rooted in the politics of settler colonialism that was initiated 
by the Green March of 1975, implemented by the Madrid Accords and was further enforced, 
physically and symbolically, by the Berm. These structures have fundamentally shaped the 
relationship between Western Sahara and Morocco.  
                                               
5 Alicia Campos-Serrano and José Antonio Rodríguez-Esteban, "Imagined Territories and Histories in Conflict 
during the Struggles for Western Sahara, 1956–1979," Journal of Historical Geography 55 (2017): 7, accessed April 
07, 2019, doi:10.1016/j.jhg.2016.11.009. 
6 Karen Farsoun and Jim Paul, “War in the Sahara: 1963,” MERIP Reports, no. 45 (1976): 13-16, doi: 
10,2307/3011767 https://www.jstor.org/stable/3011767?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents 
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Chapter I: History of the Region In Published Literature 
“Locked in a fierce war with Morocco, the Sahrawi are engaged in an international diplomatic 
battle for self-determination. Overwritten by colonial cartographies, their ancient desert 
heartlands are sharply divided by the world’s longest fortified sand berm following Spain’s 
abandoned process of decolonization and Morocco’s military invasion and occupation.”   
– Konstantina Isidoros 
 
To delve into the complexities and rich history of the Western Saharan conflict, it is 
necessary to understand the published literature and reported historiography of the region. Tony 
Hodges’ Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War (1983) provides an ethnographic and 
anthropological report of the situation in Western Sahara with a strong emphasize on the colonial 
history in the region. Hodges examines the mid-twentieth century to the 1980s, analyzing  the 
political and social climate to discern the foundations of the contested nature of Western Sahara. 
In his book, Hodges highlights the role of previous colonizers and international actors, mainly 
focusing on Spain’s role due to the time period of concern. Hodges work is very useful in 
examining the tribal structure of Sahrawi society and the subsequent changes Sahrawis 
underwent during Spanish occupation. 
The global colonial period is typically recognized as ending in the late 1960s, with the 
1990s rendering the last colonies sovereign; however, this essay will argue that a ‘post-colonial’ 
period has not yet been achieved on a global scale. For Sahrawis, the indigenous population in 
the disputed region, their territory was colonized by the Spanish as early as 1502; however, it 
wasn’t until 1884 when the Spanish officially declared a protectorate over the region of Rio de 
Oro and exercised constant force and administrative power.7 It was at this time that the Spanish 
established Villa Cisneros (present-day Dakhla) as a military fort to anchor Spanish rule in the 
                                               
7 Besenyő János, Western Sahara (Pécs: Publikon, 2009), 49. 
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region.8 Prior to the colonial founding of Villa Cisneros, from the 1500s to the later half of  the 
1880s, the territory of  Western Sahara was not cohesively ruled by the Spanish, but rather 
certain areas received more military and economic attention, notably Laayoune (El Aaiun, Al-
’Ayyun) and Dakhla.9 Areas that were less affiliated with the colonial regime and did not possess 
a military fort could, for the most part, continue partaking in traditional livelihood practices and 
expressions of their culture without Spanish involvement. This liberty that detached pockets 
benefited from was later revoked under more stringent sedentarization campaigns, a concrete 
illustration settler colonialism’s societal impacts.10  
By the 1960s, Spain was under significant international pressure to decolonize Spanish 
Sahara, which was at the time composed of two provinces ‘established’ in 1924: the Rio de Oro 
and Saguia el-Hamra. The Spanish administration did not want to relinquish their Atlantic 
stronghold as they saw both economic and strategic value in securing Western Sahara as a 
colony.11 In 1973, while Western Sahara was still under Spanish occupation, the Polisario Front 
(Frente Polisario) formed as a national liberation movement of Sahrawis mobilized with arms 
against Spanish colonizers.12 By 1975, the deteriorating health of the Spanish dictator Francisco 
Franco paired with the rising discontent with the Spanish regime in Western Sahara, led Spain to 
yield control over Spanish Sahara to focus on internal political factions.  
 
                                               
8 Besenyő János, Western Sahara (Pécs: Publikon, 2009), 49. Once Spanish claims to the region were solidified, 
Spanish fleets began fishing in the rich waters. Due to its proximity to the Canary Islands (Spanish Archipelago), 
Western Sahara was often frequented for fishing matters. In 1884, a Spanish fleet that was headed by Captaini 
Emilio Bonelli conquered Villa Cisneros (Dakhla) and created a large Fort, la Factoria. Once the fort was 
established, Spanish leaders began the process of registering Sahrawis in the Spanish census and encouraged, 
possibly forcefully, sedentary lifestyles. Due to the lack of Spanish civilians inhibiting the fort, most interactions 
with native, Sahrawis were militarized exchanges. 
9 Ben Kirat, "The Colonisation Process of Western Sahara," Sahara Question, April 03, 2018, accessed December 
13, 2018, https://sahara-question.com/en/opinions/colonisation-process-western-sahara. 
10 Ibid, 35. 
11 Robert Rézette, The Western Sahara and the frontiers of Morocco. Nouvelles éditions latines, 1975, 89. 
12 Tony Hodges, Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War, Westport, CT: L. Hill, 1984. 
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Moroccan King, Hassan II, exhibited an astute understanding of Spain’s volatile control 
in the region during the early 1970s, and saw the problems with the Franco regime back home to 
be an invitation for intervention. Aware of the two eerily close assassination attempts in 1971 
and 1972, King Hassan II organized the Green March as method of uniting Moroccans and 
gaining support for himself.13 Foreseeing the unlikeliness of Spanish immediate withdrawal, 
King Hassan II orchestrated the Green March and mobilized 350,000 Moroccans to deliberately 
journey into Western Sahara.14 A week later, on November 14th, 1975, Spain, Morocco and 
Mauritania signed the Madrid Accords, officially establishing a tripartite treaty and 
unsurprisingly excluding indigenous voices in the former Spanish Sahara.15 This diplomatic 
measure solidified the lack of indigenous recognition in the international realm and has resulted 
in decades of colonial subjugation of Sahrawis under Moroccan rule. 
The contested geography and situation in Western Sahara extends into present day with 
increased censorship and militarization of the Occupied Territories, but for the purposes of this 
thesis most of the archival resources and personal accounts will be centered around the founding 
of the Front Polisario (1973), the Green March (1975), and the construction of the Berm (1981-
1987). These events and actions highlight the monumental role nationalistic rhetoric plays on 
mobilizing Sahrawis and Moroccans to claim and/or reclaim this geography. I have selected 
these three larger moments to help ground an argument postulating that Western Sahara has been 
a site of Moroccan settler colonialism since 1975 that has employed nationalism as a mobilizing 
ideology and justification for invasion. Applying settler colonial theory and nationalism theories 
together, this essay will highlight how the Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara is in actuality 
                                               
13 Jerome B. Weiner, "The Green March in Historical Perspective," The Middle East Journal 33, no. 1 (Winter 
1979): 21, accessed April 07, 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4325817.  
14 Ibid, 20.  
15 Tami Hultman, "The Struggle for Western Sahara," Issue: A Journal of Opinion 7, no. 1 (Spring 1977): 27, 
doi:10.2307/1166371. 
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an act of settler colonialism despite the fact that the main actors are non-Anglo. It is possible that 
the overlooked plight of Sahrawis is correlated to the lack of application of settler colonial theory 
to the contested region. This site internationally draws parallels to the situation in Palestine, 
aligning liberation movements and the awareness of settler colonialism in the twenty-first 
century.  
 
Chapter II: Methodology 
“Our role is to widen the field of discussion, not to set limits in accord with the prevailing 
authority.” – Edward Said 
 
In this thesis, I will combine theory with historical analysis and interviews. The first 
chapters of this paper will be concerned with the historical rootedness of this situation and the 
actors involved as a way to situate Western Sahara both geographically and ideologically. The 
second section will encompass a literature-review of nationalism and settler colonialism theories 
and then lead into the projection of theory onto a specific geography. This application will 
highlight the relationality between the history of Western Sahara and the active role settler 
colonialism has played in the country’s fate. The third section will merge these two areas by 
citing historical events like the Green March and the Berm construction as expressions of 
nationalism conjoined with settler colonialism. The application of settler colonial theory to 
physical representations of Moroccan ‘nationalism’ in the contested region of Western Sahara 
will serve as the premise for this thesis. The fourth section will introduce a comparison to the 
settler colonial situation by examining Israel/Palestine.  
To approach the claim that Morocco has acted as a settler colonial force in Western 
Sahara since 1975, I will engage with theoretical frameworks that focus on the foundations of 
settler colonialism and its connection to nationalist sentiments. While Western Sahara has been 
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reported on, there is a significant gap in the connectivity of theories being applied to the 
geography. This thesis will make a theoretical intervention by putting together nationalist 
ideology, settler colonialism, and the overlooked aggressive role of the Moroccan military in 
conversation and then apply these theories together to the contested geography of Western 
Sahara. It is essential to look at these strands of literature and theories in conjunction with one 
another to better understand the history of the conflict and the present day status of the disputed 
region. The application of settler colonialism will also push colonial studies to incorporate non-
Anglo actors, and through the labeling of the situation as settler colonialism, might bring more 
attention to the region. Edward Said’s words stating the goal of expanding a field of knowledge 
suggests that the narrow scope of settler colonial studies application geographies should be 
broadened.  For both the historical and analytical application sections, I will incorporate and 
engage with secondary sources deriving from humanitarian reports, books, and official 
government and United Nations documents. These sources will be placed in conversation with 
different forms of primary sources including maps, original pamphlets, and interviews with local 
Sahrawis.  
By scanning Facebook, Twitter, and non-governmental organizations in the region, I have 
connected with several Sahrawis living in the Occupied Territories. I was capable of conducting 
several interviews via skype. Most interviews were conducted in English, however, some were 
conducted in Arabic with a local Sahrawi providing the English translation. All translated 
interviews will be noted in the footnotes with a disclaimer suggesting that it might not 
necessarily be an exact replica of the interviewees words. Interviews provided a local 
perspective, with Sahrawis reporting on their own experiences their family histories. Engaging 
with Sahrawis provided them a forum to express their voices and opinions that have been 
dramatically suppressed in Morocco. Ideally, these personal accounts will bring more attention to 
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the region, as Mansour and other interviewees have explicitly articulated why it is necessary for 
more people to become aware of the settler colonial situation in Western Sahara. This interview 
methodology received Yale IRB exemption approval. 
Cartographic expressions of colonialism will be utilized throughout this essay as 
examples of political and geographic intel. The maps used will highlight the location of natural 
resources, the pre- and continual colonial boundaries of the contested region, and the division of 
the area by the Berm. Irredentist claims are made by multiple parties and are dependent upon a 
form of colonial mapping that reconfigures the boundaries established at the Berlin Conference 
of 1884-1885. Maps produced by the Moroccan government and by the Front Polisario conceive 
of a much broader empire that exceeds beyond the previously defined individual country borders. 
The politics of mapping play an essential role in Moroccan nationalistic promotions of Western 
Sahara. The Moroccan government’s website overtly uses mapping techniques to incorporate the 
Southern Provinces into its borders. Google Maps partakes in the politics of mapping, as 
depending on an individual’s location, the border line changes, highlighting maps intensely 
political nature.  
Lastly, the examination of a more widely publicized contemporary example of settler 
colonialism in Israel/Palestine will serve as a comparison and differentiation point of the 
situation in Western Sahara. There exist notable similarities to the contestations presented in the 
situation in Israel/Palestine as those present in Morocco and Western Sahara in terms of 
indigeneity and nationalism, but the lack of international awareness of Western Sahara as a 
contested geography highlights the apparent differences in the conflicts. This failure of 
prominent international display of the conflict may be connected to the fact that Israel might be 
considered a more ‘Western’ power, at least relative to Morocco. The role of religion in the 
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Israel/Palestine debate might also play an essential role in the awareness of the settler colonial 
situation.  
This thesis does possess multiple limitations, with the sample size of interviewees as one 
of the largest limitations. I was only able to interview a handful of Sahrawis which significantly 
restricts the information I received. Another limitation is my positionality, as I am neither 
Sahrawi or Moroccan, I do not possess the power and experience to speak about the conflict 
from a personal perspective. It is because of this positionality that I relied on interviews to better 
illustrate the realities of Sahrawis. Thirdly, classifying what comprises Moroccan and Sahrawi 
identity and nationalism is another limitation, as both of these concepts are individualized and 
therefore could have been overgeneralized by my conclusions. Despite these limitations, I 
believe the successful placement of interview quotes, maps, official documents, and theories 
discussed together, creates new knowledge that can be applied in this contested geography.  
 
Chapter III: Nationalism and Settler Colonialism Theory 
“In its postulation of a necessary linkage between political legitimacy and ethnic identity, the 
concept of self-determination of nations contains the seeds of a radical redrawing of today’s 
political map.” – Walker Connor 
 
Part I: Nationalism Theory  
Nationalism is often incorporated as an important mechanism of settler colonialism as it 
has the ability to mobilize a large mass of people under a united identity. When analyzing 
nationalisms, it is important to understand that there is not one consolidated and agreed upon 
nationalism for an entire people, instead there exists a multiplicity of contested nationalisms. For 
the purpose of this thesis I will be referencing the nationalism developed and promoted by the 
Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic which may not necessarily be the nationalistic identity of 
every Sahrawi, but might, for the large part, constitute a majority of Sahrawi nationalistic 
     
 
Taheri 18 
thought. In terms of Moroccan nationalism, I will be examining the promotion of the official 
Moroccan state nationalist rhetoric, which also might be extremely different than some 
nationalistic identities of some Moroccans. Sahrawi and Moroccan nationalisms are not 
necessarily positioned as polar opposites as they do share many similarities; however, they are 
both contested nationalisms that compete with each other in the region which oftentimes results 
in the production of a tense, sometimes violent environment. 
Anthropologist Benedict Anderson’s conception of a nation will provide a theoretical 
framework to analyze nationalisms and what encompasses nationhood. Anderson posits a nation 
to be an ‘imaginary community’ that can transcend any geographic and physical boundaries.16 
This interpretation conceives a nation to be a collective identity that can be constructed without 
all of the nation’s members knowing each other, but because of their similar experiences, shared 
histories, cultures, and values, it does not matter that individuals do not personally know all the 
others.17 The shared values and experiences unite the people in an imaginary alliance regardless 
of their personal connections, or lack thereof, a fundamental attribute to allow nationalist rhetoric 
and thought to transcend vast territorial space. Walker Conner, a political theorist, adds that the 
essence of a nation is intangible because of the psychological bonds and subconscious processes 
of the members that conjoin together to create the nation in and of itself.18 An essential 
‘ingredient’ of the national psychology is the belief in the collective’s origin and evolution so as 
to differentiate itself from neighboring areas.19  
For Sahrawis, the ability to connect through national rhetoric is essential due to the 
fragmentation of their land as the Berm divides the Occupied Territories and the refugee camps. 
                                               
16 Benedict Anderson, Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism, Verso Books, 
2006. 
17 Ibid.   
18 Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1994). 
19 Ibid.   
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The imaginary community and collective identity functions around the Berm as a way of uniting 
Sahrawis living under Occupation and Sahrawis living in exile. National connections can be 
made through shared histories and myth making.20 Applying this to Western Sahara, the role of 
common myths and historical memories serve as crucial mobilizing actors that coalesce to fend 
off colonial claims to ‘their’ land. This creation of a national identity in contrast to the Moroccan 
construction of colonial structures has resulted in contested nationalisms to be present in the 
region.  
The role of the imaginary is essential in both Sahrawi and Moroccan nationalism. For the 
Moroccan state, the ‘imagined community’ exceeds the internationally recognized boundaries of 
the country with the envisioned ‘Greater Morocco’ engulfing almost all of Mauritania and large 
portions of Algeria and Mali (Fig. III). The grey shaded region is the Moroccan Monarchy’s 
holistic vision of Morocco’s borders in a post-colonial age where irredentist claims should be 
heavily considered. The black area is the actual Kingdom of Morocco, and the dark red is 
considered  the Occupied Territories, or Occupied Western Sahara, leaving the bright red to be 
the Front Polisario self- run Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. The notion of ‘Greater 
Morocco’ or ‘national territory integrity’ is rooted in irredentist thought that sustains Morocco’s 
boundaries should be reverted to pre- French and Spanish colonial divisions and serves as a 
foundational component of Moroccan state-sponsored nationalism.21 Interestingly, while this 
map identifies the vision of ‘Greater Morocco’ to include the entirety of Mauritania and large 
                                               
20 Stuart Hall, "Cultural identity and diaspora," Diaspora and visual culture, pp. 35-47. Routledge, 2014. 
21 Tony Hodges, "The Origins of Saharawi Nationalism," Third World Quarterly 5, no. 1 (1983): 38, 
doi:10.1080/01436598308419678. “King Mohammed V had formally endorsed Allal el-Fassi’s ‘Greater Morocco’ 
theses… on 25 February 1958, he had pledged to ‘continue to do everything in our power to recover our Sahara and 
all that which, by historical evidence and by the will of its inhabitants, belongs as of right to our kingdom.’ He has 
done so to prevent the Istiqlal Party from outpacing the monarchy in nationalist fevour and because, by glorifying 
the conquests of the more powerful of Morocco’s pre-colonial sultans, Allal el-Fassi’s ideology could easily be 
turned to royal ends, to boost the prestige of the monarchy.” This citation illustrates the immense role nationalism 
played in the actions and thought processes of King Mohammed V and later its impact on his son, King Hassan II’s 
decision to invade Western Sahara.   
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segments of Mali and Algeria, the Morocco government recognized the sovereignty of these 
nations and stopped pursuing their territory. By 1969 Morocco had formally recognized 
Mauritanian independence and relinquished that aspect of the ‘Greater Morocco’ vision;22 
however, possibly due to the fact that Western Sahara was not organized in a nation-state 
 formation, Western Sahara was not recognized as independence like the neighboring countries 
and therefore Morocco continued the quest of completing a ‘Greater Morocco’ vision.  
Morocco’s national rhetoric promotes the belief that RASD is a state operated by guerilla 
terrorists who are blocking the reunification of the Moroccan nation. In the Morocco 
                                               
22 Alicia Campos-Serrano and José Antonio Rodríguez-Esteban, "Imagined Territories and Histories in Conflict 
during the Struggles for Western Sahara, 1956–1979," Journal of Historical Geography 55 (2017): 8, accessed April 
07, 2019, doi:10.1016/j.jhg.2016.11.009.  
Figure III: A map depicting 'Greater Morocco' 
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government’s view, the ‘imagined community’ is one which encompasses Western Sahara and 
Sahrawi people as a subset of Moroccan identity. This becomes evident in the Moroccan 
Constitution of 2011 where it employs “Saharan-Hassanic” as a linguistic subset of Moroccan 
identity, but fails to acknowledge the terminology of Sahrawi as that would indicate that 
Sahrawis possess a different identity than Moroccans.23 The omission of incorporating Sahrawis 
into the constitution illuminates the Moroccan government’s understanding of Sahrawis to be 
Moroccans who speak a different dialect but are not necessarily comprised of an entirely 
different identity and separate ethnic group. This reinforces national rhetoric as mobilizing settler 
colonial actions in Western Sahara, as in the eyes of the Moroccan government, they are in fact 
uniting ‘the people’ as there exist no identity divisions.  
For Sahrawis, the nationalist imaginary reconstructs the spatial distance between Sahrawi 
refugees and Sahrawis living under occupation. The enormous Sahrawi refugee camps in 
Tindouf, Algeria exemplify the role of nationalist imaginary where exiled and displaced 
Sahrawis have renamed the settlements according to important cities in Western Sahara. Despite 
the fact that the Sahrawis living in the camps are removed from their territory and home, they 
actively connect to the Sahrawi imaginary through the process of home-making and 
remembrance by naming entire wilayas (districts) at the camps after towns in Western Sahara; 
Dakhla, Smara, Laayoune, Aousserd and Cape Bojador.24 Not only are the Sahrawis 
commemorating five major towns in Western Sahara, but they selected five cities that are 
specifically housed within the Moroccan controlled area of Western Sahara. This deliberate 
choice underlines the targeted message of resistance and promotion of nationalism that is bred 
out of SADR.25  
                                               
23 Morocco. Morocco's Constitution of 2011. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Morocco_2011.pdf        
24 Alice Wilson, Sovereignty in Exile: A Saharan Liberation Movement Governs, Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2016. 
25 Ibid.  
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 Sahrawis who have shared similar experiences, traumas, values, and specific 
relationships to the territory comprise of SADR, the ‘imagined community,’. Alicia Campos-
Serrano and Jose Antonio Rodriguez-Esteban’s article “Imagined Territories and histories in 
conflict during the struggles for Western Sahara, 1956-1979” underlines the historical 
foundations that have resulted in the creation of a specific Sahrawi identity and an imagined 
community. Campos-Serrano, Rodriguez-Esteban, and authors of the book War and Refugees: 
The Western Sahara Conflict Richard Lawless and Laila Monahan, all identified the colonial 
powers’ discovery of natural resources to be a turning point in the formation of Sahrawi 
collective identity. The increased interest in resource extrapolation resulted in the Spaniards’ 
development of cities and mines, altering the entire social and economic landscape of the region. 
Subsequently, the change in urbanization and employment industries shifted the Sahrawis 
nomadic lifestyle, thereby emphasizing the social alterations that resulted from colonial regimes.  
The social integration of Sahrawis into mines and cities, resulted in an increased visibility 
of the social segregation and discrimination against local indigenous populations. Campos-
Serrano and Rodriguez-Esteban assert that it was this explicit pressure and subjugation which 
catalyzed the articulation of a Sahrawi nation and a separate Sahrawi identity rather than existing 
as a subset of Moroccan identity. This differentiation in visions and conceptualizations of 
‘imagined communities’ functions as a driver of division between the two nationalist rhetoric 
and can be further explored to understand the relationship between nationalism and settler 
colonialism.  
Moroccan rhetoric and political actions often indicate that the lack of Sahrawi collective 
identity and organized resistance movements documented before the Green March imply that 
SADR did not and does not possess a legitimate claim to the region. As Tony Hodges notes, 
there were no historical antecedents to Western Sahara, as no pre-colonial nation of Sahrawis 
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was ever formed.26 He further states that Sahrawi nationalism is rooted in more recent events and 
conflicts;27 however, simply because the Sahrawis were functioning on smaller tribal affiliations 
before and during much of the Spanish colonial period, that does not  preclude SADR from 
making a nationalist claim to the land at a later time. Moroccan claims are entrenched in the idea 
that in order to claim sovereignty and indigeneity there had to previously had been an organized 
collective, which in the case of Western Sahara was not in existence. The lack of Sahrawi 
collective identity prior to the Green March has resulted in Morocco’s delegitimization of 
Sahrawi land claims. Due to Morocco’s reliance on a system of nation-state organization that is 
formulated in contrast to tribal affiliation, Sahrawi indigeneity and land claims appear to be 
irrelevant in protecting the sovereignty of Western Sahara.   
Sahrawi nationalism and nation formation is a product of colonial interactions. Campos-
Serrano and Rodriguez-Estaban introduce the notion of an alternative Sahrawi- imagined 
territory and community referred to as Al Badia, which connected Sahrawi kabilas that spoke 
Hassaniya Arabic that shared many cultural practices together to formulate a collective Sahrawi 
space.28 Despite Sahrawi nationalism that was constructed in opposition to colonialism, the 
representation of the imagined nation promotes territorial claims that are superimposed on 
previous colonial boundaries. This was a result of the Sahrawi movement’s inability to make 
land claims to regions that were already internationally proclaimed ‘sovereign,’ such as 
Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, or Mali; however, this also shows the paradoxical nature of 
boundary making.29 This phenomenon of rejecting colonial boundaries, but in actuality relying 
on colonial borders, emphasizes the power of  mapping as a colonial tool as well as the 
                                               
26 Tony Hodges, Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War, Westport, CT: L. Hill, 1984. 
27Ibid, 149.  
28 Alicia Campos-Serrano and José Antonio Rodríguez-Esteban, "Imagined Territories and Histories in Conflict 
during the Struggles for Western Sahara, 1956–1979," Journal of Historical Geography 55 (2017): 53, accessed 
April 07, 2019, doi:10.1016/j.jhg.2016.11.009. 
29 Ibid.  
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intertwined nature of Sahrawi and Moroccan nationalisms since Sahrawi nationalism is 
constructed in opposition of a Moroccan ‘other.’ Despite the physical borders that are dividing 
the population, the “Saharawi nation is now imagined as a transnational community spread 
across different spaces, from the refugee camps to the Moroccan-occupied territory,”30 
emphasizing the creation and maintenance of an ‘imagined community.’  
In terms of further developing an understanding of what a nation is, theorist Ernst Renan 
proclaims that “a nation is a soul, a spiritual principle” which is composed of two separate, but 
necessary temporal parts; the past and the present.31 This conceptualization underlines the 
inherent privileging and perpetuation of certain traditions and heritages as the premises of what 
continues to constitute the nation are determined based on the memorialization and continuation 
of certain historical events into the present. Utilizing this theory of nationhood, shared histories, 
myths, heroes, events and legends would all serve to unite an ‘imagined community’ and 
therefore create a nation, whether it be physical or ideological. Connor theorizes nation 
formation as a recent phenomenon that is a function of mobilizing the masses from individual 
ethnies.32 Applied to Western Sahara, this would suggest that nation formation of Sahrawis 
began once tribal affiliations were placed on the periphery to allow for collective identity to 
form. He contends that nationalism is inherently laced with ethnic character and therefore should 
be classified as ethnonationalism. Walker Connor pronounces that “while an ethnic group may, 
therefore, be other-defined, the nation must be self-defined,”33 implying that the Sahrawi Arab 
                                               
30 Alicia Campos-Serrano and José Antonio Rodríguez-Esteban, "Imagined Territories and Histories in Conflict 
during the Struggles for Western Sahara, 1956–1979," Journal of Historical Geography 55 (2017): 59, accessed 
April 07, 2019, doi:10.1016/j.jhg.2016.11.009.5 
31 Ernest Renan, Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?, République des Lettres, 2012. 
32 Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1994). 
33 Ibid.  
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Democratic Republic, which was self-proclaimed, is a nation that distances Sahrawis from 
Moroccans, regardless of Morocco’s perception.  
 
Part II: Settler Colonialism Theory  
Settler Colonialism is often cited when referencing the creation of Israel and the 
subjugation of Palestinians or Native American Indigenous communities, but less frequently is 
the terminology of settler colonialism applied to Western Sahara. This thesis intervenes at a 
crucial point in settler colonial studies, where the focus of settler colonial examples is Anglo-
oriented and fails to account for non-Western powers colonial actions. For the purposes of 
defining the ‘Orient’ the term referred to will reference Edward Said’s concept of Orientalism. 
He situates the so-called Orient as a group of people with specific racial, cultural and political 
characteristics.34 This term is often juxtaposed to the ‘Occident’ or ‘West,’ typically following 
white, Anglo categorization. Settler colonial studies tends to focus on situations where the 
colonizer is a white, Western nation-state power and the colonized is a racialized, less structured, 
ambiguous body of people. This is particularly true when examining North American and South 
African settler colonialism.   
 While certain ‘orient-orient’ settler colonial subjugations are frequently overlooked and 
not featured in the field of study, there is international recognition of internal colonialism 
occurring in the ‘Orient.’ For example, Ba’athist Iraq and the Arabization campaigns that 
occurred in the Northern Iraq were internationally condemned; however, with regard to settler 
colonial global intervention, most of the focus is relegated to situations engaging with ‘Western’ 
actors. Typically, settler colonial studies focuses on examples of white settlers intervening in 
another country such as, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, the United States and 
                                               
34 Edward Said, "Zionism from the Standpoint of Its Victims," Social Text, no. 1 (1979): 7-58. doi:10.2307/466405, 
7.   
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Israel/Palestine. When analyzing the situation in Western  Sahara it is interesting to note that 
prior to Moroccan colonization, Spain, considered a ‘Western’ power, had colonized the region 
and received significant amount of global dissatisfaction with their ongoing colonial actions. 
This scolding of the Franco regime highlights the prejudices of settler colonial theory 
applications, as only when a so-called Western actor was involved did the international 
community respond by labeling the situation colonialism. This thesis will push the boundaries of 
settler colonial theory by applying the terminology to a ‘non-Western’ actor: Morocco. Both 
parties, Morocco and Sahrawis, are non-white, non-Anglo, non-Western actors and because of 
these demographics it appears that this contested geography receives less international attention.  
Patrick Wolfe, a trained anthropologist and ethnographer, has become an established 
theorist in unpacking settler colonialism by focusing on the settler colonial history of New 
Zealand. He interprets settler colonialism to be a holistic, long-term situation, where “the 
colonizers come to  stay -- invasion is a structure not an event.”35 This interpretation does not 
preclude events from playing integral roles in settler colonial regimes, instead this nuanced 
understanding of settler colonialism emphasizes the role of structural factors coming together to 
produce a situation of settler colonialism, such as administrative decisions, military actions, 
settlement creations, etc. It is through Wolfe’s comprehensive lens that this thesis will examine 
the Green March as an ongoing process not only limited to November 6th, 1975, but rather, a 
structure that has present-day effects on the settler colonial situation in Western Sahara. By 
interpreting the Green March as a structure, it expands the analysis of the Green March to 
encompass more than a single snapshot moment when Moroccans physically entered the 
territory, and instead broadens the Green March to also comprise of the period of militarization 
before and after the Green March. This interpretation emphasizes the longevity of the colonizers 
                                               
35 Patrick Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” Journal of Genocide Research 8, no. 4 
(2006): 387–409. 
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intended stay and eradicates the notion of Moroccan temporary, limited control. This application 
of Wolfe’s conceptualization of settler colonialism removes the historical temporality of settler 
colonialism, as the structure of Morocco’s colonial presence continues to persist and influence 
social formations beyond their origin, whereas events are typically relegated to a specific time 
period. 
 Employing Wolfe’s understanding of settler colonialism to Western Sahara, the Green 
March and the construction of the Berm serve as two structures that maintain the hierarchies 
fabricated by the colonizer. He situates the role of altering social structures and societal 
dynamics as the colonizer utilizing the “logic of elimination.”36 While typically the terminology 
of elimination connotes violent genocide, he clarifies that there are other more ‘subtle’ forms of 
achieving the eradication of the native. I would argue the process of elimination is inherently 
violent whether it be physically, emotionally or psychologically. While many people and states 
would not classify Morocco’s actions as a physical genocide, Mansour’s friend, Mamain37, 
stated, “The genocide had begun militarily, and now there is a new genocide in the sense of 
obliterating culture, identity, and the demographic of the people in Western Sahara.”38 Mamain 
works for a local non-governmental organization alongside Mansour, exposing the realities of 
the Moroccan regime through journalism and photographs. His citation above alludes to the 
potential ongoing cultural genocide, aligning Wolfe’s understanding of settler colonialism as a 
structure that is actively altering society by culturally purging it. Wolfe contends that the 
motivation for settler colonialism is not racism or discrimination on the basis of religion and 
                                               
36 Patrick Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” Journal of Genocide Research 8, no. 4 
(2006): 387–409.  
37 Similar to Mansour, Mamain is not the interviewees real name. To preserve his identity, he has been given the 
name Mamain.  
38 Mamain, interviewed by Amanda Taheri, February 12, 2019. [Note all interviews with Mamain were translated by 
Mansour as I cannot speak Arabic.]  
     
 
Taheri 28 
ethnicity, but rather a desire for the access to territory.39 This understanding of settler colonialism 
interprets the Moroccan invasion as an act of reclaiming territory rather than an act of 
discrimination against the Sahrawi people. This hierarchy of discriminatory motives will be 
further explored in the context of the Green March, the Berm, and the location of natural 
resource reserves where the motives of territory collection become starkly evident. 
A second settler colonialism theorist to place in conversation with Patrick Wolfe is 
Lorenzo Veracini, who highlights the importance of space in understanding settler colonialism. 
He concludes that a defining feature of settler colonialism is that the colonizer possess the ability 
to move across space whereas the colonized is almost entirely restricted in their ability to freely 
move.40 He also explicitly focuses on the differentiation between settler colonialism and 
colonialism, declaring that the different forms of colonialism possess different end goals. 
Proclaiming that settler colonialism’s trajectory is to create and alter a society so much that it is 
no longer identified as a settler colony, Veracini situates the eradication of ethnic diversity as an 
end goal of settler colonialism.41 To further discern the distinctions in the colonial forms of  
dominance, Veracini paraphrases Wolfe, stating that unlike colonialism, settler colonialism is not 
a master-servant relationship marked by ethnic difference, but rather the goal of settler 
colonialism is centered around land acquisition. This differentiates settler colonialism from 
colonialism where obtaining a large, native work force for purposes of exploitation are the top 
priorities.42 The resulting discernment is that settler colonialism is more focused on replacement 
of the native, whereas colonialism is fixated on exploitation.43  In the Moroccan/Western Sahara 
context, replacement does not necessarily mean replacing Sahrawi with Moroccans, but could 
                                               
39 Patrick Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” Journal of Genocide Research 8, no. 4 
(2006): 387–409. 
40 Lorenzo Veracini, Settler Colonialism, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 
41 Ibid,  
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
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also mean that the Sahrawis living in Western Sahara are Moroccans and thereby ‘replacing’ 
them as ethnic others.  
While examining the case study of Israel/Palestine, Veracini discusses the intimate 
relationship between migration and settler colonialism which contends that “settlers are made by 
conquest, not just by immigration,”44 expunging the possibility of settler colonialism occurring 
haphazardly in an act of migration. In his analysis, he outlines twenty-six different forms of 
settler colonialism, with Administrative Transfer most closely replicating the situation in 
Western Sahara. Veracini defines Administrative transfer as 
“when administrative borders of the settler polity are redrawn and indigenous people lose 
entitlements… in this case, as the settler entity retains the sovereign capacity to draw and 
enforce administrative boundaries, it is rights -- not bodies-- that are transferred, and 
indigenous peoples become the subject of a transfer that does not necessarily displace 
them physically.”45 
This understanding of settler colonialism can be applied to the population of Sahrawis living 
under Moroccan rule in the Occupied Territories but is less useful when applying to the diaspora 
living in Tindouf, Algeria. This theory of Administrative Transfer highlights Morocco’s imperial 
capacity to draw boundaries where indigenous people ‘lose entitlements’ such as phosphate 
reserves, established cities, rich fishing areas and the liberty of mobility. Morocco utilizes the 
Berm as a physical enforcement mechanism of altering administrative borders. While Veracini’s 
Administrative Transfer theory does not apply to the thousands of Sahrawi refugees who fled to 
refugee camps, it does explain why and how there are Sahrawis living in the Occupied 
Territories, as their rights—not their bodies—have been transferred. This includes their rights to 
mobilize, dissent, learn their own history and engage in liberation activities. The removal of 
Sahrawis’ rights conjoins with Wolfe’s conceptualization of the ‘logic of elimination,’ and 
replacement as mobilizing forces behind settler colonialism.  
                                               
44 Lorenzo Veracini, Israel and settler society, London: Pluto Press, 2006, 3. 
45 Ibid, 44.  
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Part III: The Convergence of Nationalism and Settler Colonial Theory 
Nationalism and Settler Colonialism are intimately related terms, and while independent, 
they do, especially in this specific geography, fuel one another. Nationalism can be explored as a 
motive for creating settler colonial structures. On the other hand, settler colonialism can be 
considered a physical exemplification of nationalism and an active response to threats of 
nationalism, such as the alteration of collective myths, shared histories or land acquisitions. This  
enmeshed relationship that twists nationalism and settler colonialism together is distinguishable 
in the Moroccan state’s rhetoric. For example, by citing the Sahrawi tribes’ previous allegiance 
to the Sherifan Empire, Morocco concludes that there existed a significant relationship between 
the people of the Southern Provinces and Morocco, therefore, through religious linkage, 
Morocco subsumes Sahrawis to exist as a category of Moroccan identity. 46 The relegation of  
Sahrawi to only constitute a subset of a larger identity, actively utilizes nationalism and 
nationalist thought to fabricate the structures of a settler colonial society. In Zunes and Mundy’s 
analysis of the situation, they reported that Morocco claims, “Western Sahara had ‘always been 
linked to the interior of Morocco by common ethnological, cultural and religious ties’ that had 
been severed by European colonization,”47 emphasizing the recuperation of the Southern 
Provinces as a form of reunifying the nation to its original form. The concept of Sahrawi tribes 
having sworn allegiance to the Sultan introduces the question of whether the tribes that aligned 
themselves with the political entity of the Sultan and his ‘spiritual authority’ were partaking in a 
                                               
46 Alicia Campos-Serrano and José Antonio Rodríguez-Esteban, "Imagined Territories and Histories in Conflict 
during the Struggles for Western Sahara, 1956–1979," Journal of Historical Geography 55 (2017): 47, accessed 
April 07, 2019, doi:10.1016/j.jhg.2016.11.009. 
47 Jacob Mundy and Stephen Zunes, Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution. Syracuse: 
Syracuse Univ Press, 2010, 107. 
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form of ‘civic’ nationalism.48 Sahrawis and Moroccans answer this question differently, showing 
the tension between the two parties and their interlocking history.   
 The convergence of settler colonialism and nationalism is displayed in the Moroccan 
government’s use of anti-colonialism as a mobilizing nationalist ideology. Essentially, the 
Moroccan government utilizes a specific historical lens to construe the Southern Provinces in a 
certain historical light, and by doing so, blurs the binary of anti-colonialist/ colonialist. This is 
best exemplified by the Moroccan government’s motivations and subsequent actions culminated 
by the Green March of 1975. To justify the civilian and military invasion, King Hassan II 
emphasized the necessity to liberate the Southern Provinces from the Spanish colonialists and 
thereby engage in an anti-colonialist campaign. King Hassan II politically altered the region 
through his military commitment to anti-colonialism which subsequently reified Moroccans with 
a sense of purpose.49 By employing nationalist rhetoric that implicitly painted Morocco as an 
anti-colonial savior and liberator of the contested region, Morocco commenced the initial settler 
colonial invasion into Western Sahara with the Moroccan peoples’ support via exploiting their 
nationalistic support.   
Another example of Morocco employing nationalist ideology to create structures of 
settler colonialism, is the Moroccan claim that the reunification of the provinces was part of an 
anti-colonialist struggle against European colonial-dictated boundaries, thus combating settler 
colonialism by redrawing the map of Morocco.  In this framework, the restoration of the is 
Kingdom viewed as a struggle against colonialism and therefore engages with nationalism to 
produce settler colonial structures. This framework mirrors the Front Polisario’s nationalist 
framework in the sense that they both utilize anti-colonialism as their motivator. Despite the 
                                               
48 Jacob Mundy and Stephen Zunes, Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution. Syracuse: 
Syracuse Univ Press, 2010, 107.   
49 Jerome B. Weiner, "The Green March in Historical Perspective," The Middle East Journal 33, no. 1 (Winter 
1979): 21, accessed April 07, 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4325817. 
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similarity in frameworks, the two nationalisms compete due to their opposite claims of what 
constitutes anti-colonialism.  
The Moroccan 
Kingdom’s website includes a 
map of Morocco which 
encompasses all of Western 
Sahara, illustrating the deep 
rootedness of this nationalistic, 
irredentist thought (Fig. IV). In 
addition, the government has 
specific economic 
development plans outlined on 
their website, such as the Azur 
Plan that aims to optimize 
tourism to the Southern 
Provinces, specifically at sites 
like Dakhla.50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
50 "Azur Plan," Kingdom of Morocco Ministry of Culture and Communication, August 08, 2018, accessed 
December 13, 2018, http://www.maroc.ma/en/content/azur-plan.  
Figure IV: The Official Map of Morocco as found on the Moroccan 
Government Website 
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Chapter IV: Sahrawi Identity and Political Formations 
“In primary schools we were forced to speak in the Moroccan accent, taught untrue facts, and 
had to draw the map of Morocco including Western Sahara. This is a problem of identity; 
obstructing our culture.” – Mansour 
 
Identity and identity formations are inherently complex and seemingly impossible to 
detangle as there are a plethora of sources, experiences, and components that coincide to produce 
a singular identity. With regards to Sahrawi identity there are several factors that constitute a 
collective identity which in turn plays a fundamental role in Sahrawi nationalism. Stephen Zunes 
and Jacob Mundy situate Sahrawi identity as extending “beyond the Moroccan territorial and 
relational understanding, as it can incorporate blood and shared history as an ‘ethnos’ in addition 
to land claims.”51 A shared history of blood ties, language and pastoral nomadism are common 
threads weaved into Sahrawi identity.52 Some Sahrawis and archival ethnographies have 
indicated that “the actual Sahrawis are direct descendants from tribes that originated in 
Yemen.”53 However, according to Mansour, not all Sahrawis are descendants from Yemeni 
tribes as some Sahrawis have Arabs and Amazigh ties, although their Yemeni roots are often 
considered a distinct attribute of Sahrawis that differentiates them from Moroccans.54 Tribes and 
tribal affiliations are still prevalent in Sahrawi society with 22 official tribes, although they now 
play less of a leading role in society since the collective resistance movement and collaborative 
environment of the refugee camps the affiliations are second to Sahrawi collective identity.55 In 
Alice Wilson’s Sovereignty in Exile she traces the historical prominence of Sahrawi tribal 
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54 Mansour, interviewed by Amanda Taheri, February 16th, 2019.  
55  "Saharawi Culture," Organization for Statehood and Freedom, accessed March 07, 2019, 
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affiliations prior to a united Sahrawi resistance movement. Proclaiming that the Front Polisario 
emphasizes a united, uniform Sahrawi identity, she situates that the current form of resistance 
and mobilization disregards previous historical affiliations.56  
Zunes and Mundy contend that the concept of a Sahrawian people as a collective identity 
is a relatively new development as it was not until the twentieth century that Sahrawis from 
different tribes started to unite to resist colonizing powers, largely a result of sedentarization.57 
Prior to the formation of the Front Polisario, Sahrawis were rarely unified outside of their tribal 
formations, as they mainly partook in tribal nomadic lifestyles. Sedentary lifestyles were heavily 
privileged and coerced under Spanish colonial rule particularly with the discovery and 
subsequent exploitation of phosphate found at Bou Craa which encouraged many Sahrawis to 
work in the phosphate industry and lead sedentary lives.58 Campos and Rodriguez identified the 
recent factors that had led to the sedentarization of Sahrawis, most notably the Spanish discovery 
of phosphate mines, the subsequent establishment of mine cities and the horrific drought of 
1953-1963, which killed approximately 46 percent of the country’s camels.59 Census data reports 
indicate that 18% of the Sahrawi population lived outside of urban centers by 1974.60 Fig. V 
displays this information visually by showing the growth of three large towns, El-Ayoun, Smara, 
                                               
56 Ethnically speaking, Sahrawis share mixed descendants from Berbers, Arabs, and Black Africans. Sahrawis speak 
a specific Arabic dialect, Hassaniya, that differs from Moroccan Arabic or Darija Hodges article states that “Besides 
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Villa Cisneros between 1967-1974.61 Despite the efforts to sedentarize Sahrawi populations 
through the development of larger cities and the construction of the Berm, a foundational aspect 
in Sahrawi identity is mobility.62 The Moroccan government directly combats Sahrawi mobility 
through the construction of the Berm as a physical barrier which eliminates Sahrawis from 
partaking in a nomadic lifestyle and traditional forms of animal raising.63  
Another core component of Sahrawi identity is the collective experience of displacement 
from their homeland after the Green March and subsequent military control. Once Spain signed 
over Western Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania at the Madrid Accords, there was a mass 
exodus of Sahrawis. This led to an involuntary state of exile where Sahrawis are constantly 
reinforcing their nationalistic views through the Front Polisario. Estimates suggest there are 
approximately 173,600 Sahrawi refugees living in the Tindouf refugee camps.64 The magnitude 
of Sahrawis living in the diaspora has influenced Sahrawi identity to be largely shaped around 
                                               
61 Tony Hodges, "The Origins of Saharawi Nationalism," Third World Quarterly 5, no. 1 (1983): 36, 
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Figure V: A table showing the growth of the Sahrawi population in three urban centers from 1967-1974 
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managing their exilic lives where they are militarily separated from their homeland and families. 
Alice Wilson’s book Sovereignty in Exile delves into how daily life is organized in the refugee 
camps. Her remarks on the camps autonomy emphasizes the ability for Sahrawis living in the 
camps to unify beyond tribal affiliations and instead, coalesce under a larger umbrella of national 
Sahrawi identity as promoted by the Front Polisario.65 Unlike most refugee camps, the camps are 
self-organized and governed by Sahrawi refugees themselves, typically Front Polisario 
members.66  
Alice Wilson notes the difference in schooling that Sahrawis receive in the camps and the 
educational content Sahrawis living in the Occupied Territories experience. The greatest 
difference being the infiltration of Moroccan historic accounts blurring over the historic past in 
Western Sahara and emphasizing the Moroccan brotherhood with the Southern Provinces, 
whereas history textbooks in the Tindouf camps celebrate Sahrawi tribes historical resistance 
against colonialism.67 In the self-governed camps in Tindouf, Sahrawis are active in the process 
of home making and claiming their new territory as exemplified by the decision to name entire 
wilayas (districts) after cities in Western Sahara. There are five wilayas in the Tindouf camps: 
Laayoune, Awserd, Smara, Dakhla and Cape Bojador.68 Importantly, these five cities are housed 
within the Moroccan controlled area of Western Sahara, emphasizing the active message of 
resistance and nationalism that RASD is promoting despite the displaced nature of its population.  
It wasn’t until 1957-1958 that thousands of Sahrawis began to unite under an umbrella of 
anticolonial struggle as a result of an insurrection by the Moroccan Army of Liberation.69 A few 
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years later in the 1960s and early 1970s, Sahrawis began powerfully mobilizing under a fiercer 
anti-colonialist cause that shifted tribal affiliations to the periphery to assume a more ‘national 
consciousness’ forged against an oppressive, colonialist ‘other.’70 The founding of the Front 
Polisario and national Sahrawi resistance movements dates back to the sedentarization of 
Sahrawis and the assumed social and political subjugation and hierarchy that appeared during 
Spanish colonialism.71 Mohamed Sidi Ibrahim Basir established the Organizacion Avanzada 
para la Liberacion del Sahara (Advanced Organization for the Sahara Liberation) in the late 
1960s and promoted the notion of autonomy for the region in his speeches and in print 
newspapers.72 This organization was the first articulation of a Sahrawi nation independent from 
Spain, Morocco and Mauritania.73 Notably, Basir was a journalist and Qur’anic teacher, which 
resulted in his decision to publicize his words in newspapers which ultimately spread the 
nationalist sentiments to Sahrawis in different neighborhoods and cities.74 Benedict Anderson 
pronounced print culture, such as the dissemination of Basir’s vision, to be a defining feature of 
the success and ability to connect peoples across boundaries and land masses, resulting in the 
creation of an imagined community.  
Anderson believes that the development and flourishment of print culture has largely 
been responsible for the ability to develop an imagined community and sense of nationalism as 
depicted by the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (la république arabe sahraouie 
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démocratique). In 1973, three years after the Zemla Intifada, a bloody massacre of a civilian 
protest which resulted in the ‘disappearance of Basir,’ Sahrawis living in exile in Zuerat, 
Mauritania, mobilized and founded the Front Polisario under the leadership of El-Ouali 
Mustapha Sayed, on April 29th, 1973. 75  The group’s mission focused on disturbing the colonial 
powers and their actions included sabotaging phosphate infrastructures, attacking border posts, 
and forming mutinies in colonial troops.76 Later, the Polisario Front, maintaining its crusade 
against colonialism, altered its focus to Morocco and Mauritania. The Front Polisario employed 
guerilla tactics and urged Sahrawis to join the anti-colonial fight. Seven days before the Green 
March, on October 31st, 1975, the Front Polisario was confronted by the Moroccan army as they 
entered the Northwestern region of Western Sahara. Since that altercation, the Front Polisario 
has been fighting both militarily and diplomatically against Morocco, with the short exception of 
also fighting against Mauritania until 1979. 
The Front Polisario declared the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR/RASD) in 
1976, a year after the 
invasion of the Green 
March and three years 
after the establishment 
of the Front Polisario. 
Most of the Front 
Polisario’s propaganda 
is constructed around an 
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Figure VI: A propaganda image that is centered around civilian militarization 
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armed/peace paradigm, with Fig. VI illustrating the paradoxical nature of the Front Polisario’s 
goal and mechanisms to achieve said goal.  Fig. VI states “[the struggle continues to impose 
national independence and peace]”77 with presumably an AK-47 or a M16 serving as the image 
centered in the text. The image is a call to arms for civilians with the purposes of bringing peace, 
a paradoxical claim that engaging in violent conflict will result in peace. 
However, many Sahrawis 
don’t see another choice other 
than militarizing as the 
international community pays 
minimal attention to the 
contested region and 
diplomatically Western Sahara 
does not receive enough support. 
A second example, Fig. VII, is an 
illustration of a Sahrawian 
mother and infant closely 
entwined with an AK-47 or M16 
resting right on the mother’s shoulder. As Konstantina Isidoros exemplifies in her book, Nomads 
and Nation-building in the Western Sahara: Gender, Politics and the Sahrawi, women play a 
central role in Sahrawi culture and the fact that a woman is centered in this political call to arms 
indicates that the fight for independence is not gendered, but rather all members of society can 
partake.78 In addition to the machine gun, the SADR flag is in the corner, emphasizing the fight 
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Figure VII:  Sahrawi mother with her child carrying arms and a  
Front Polisario flag 
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for liberation and self-determination of the people for this specific territory. These images reify 
that the Front Polisario is a resistance movement developed by a common people with the goal of 
self-determination through means of arming civilians to self-govern SADR. The Moroccan 
government engages with forms of militarization to combat this ‘guerilla warfare’ group.  
 
Chapter V: Green March (Al Massira) 1975 
“The Green March led to the Madrid Accords: the beginning of another colonizing power.” 
– Mansour 
 
 The Sahrawi perspective of the Green March is rarely heard on an international scale in 
contrast to the Moroccan and Spanish projection of the event which is widely acknowledged; 
however, despite these fabrications, the Green March cannot be relegated as a ‘peaceful’ 
expression of heroism by the Moroccan army. Officially occurring on November 6th, 1975, the 
Green March (al Massira in Arabic) served as a prop to hide the violent intervention and physical 
force deployed by the Moroccan administration and military elsewhere in Western Sahara. 
Grabbing the attention of Moroccans through radio and television, King Hassan II rallied his 
people to participate in a march reclaiming Moroccan territory.79 His  speeches employed 
rhetoric like “récupération du Sahara”80 to instill a nationalistic notion of heroism and 
brotherhood. He depicted the process of reclaiming the Southern provinces as actively protecting 
them from a colonial ‘other,’ Spain. Concocted as a ploy to regain political power and legitimacy 
after the two coup attempts in 1971 and 1972,81 the Green March served as a uniting event for 
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Moroccans that was mobilized by nationalistic and religious beliefs. Through his promotion of 
the need to liberate the Southern Provinces, King Hassan II was able to gather a cohort of 
350,000 Moroccans to march into Western Sahara with the intention of forcing the Spanish 
colonizers out. Marchers were not equipped with arms, but rather carried Qurans, posters of the 
King’s face, and large Moroccan flags (Fig. VIII).  
The March was titled ‘Green’ in reference to the symbol of Islam as depicted by the 
Quran which allowed the marchers to be “armed only with ‘the Holy Book of Allah’”82 
reiterating the peaceful nature of the march. Tony Hodges underlines the accentuation of the 
religious element of the Green March, as marchers “were encouraged to regard themselves as 
                                               
82 Tony Hodges, Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War, Westport, CT: L. Hill, 1984, 211. 
Figure VIII: Moroccans participating in the Green March of 1975 carrying Qurans, Flags, and photos of the King 
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mujahidin, or warriors of God, in a holy as well as a national crusade to drive colonialist infidels 
from Islamic, Moroccan soil.”83 It was through this mobilization of religion and its connection to 
deep rooted nationalism that settler colonialism took place in the region. 
Despite the presence of the Spanish military in the territory the marchers were not fired 
upon when trespassing into the territory. The Moroccans and Spaniards engaged in a peaceful 
encounter and later, King Hassan II ordered the marchers to recoil.84 Francisco Franco’s 
deteriorating health was a fundamental factor that led to Spain reluctance to be implicated in any 
physical conflict. Several days later on November 14th, Morocco, Spain and Mauritania signed 
the Madrid Accords, ending the official colonizing role of Spain in Western Sahara. Mansour’s 
citation identified the Green March as the beginning of another colonizing power where the 
Moroccans replaced the Spanish officially by the 14th of November with the singing of the 
Madrid Accords, which notably bestowed Western Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania. In 
exchange for ‘giving up the colony,’ Spain would maintain the right to 35%  share of all future 
mineral exploitation, mainly  phosphate, and some rights over specific fisheries,85 further 
exploiting the land and refusing the Sahrawis their own resources.  
The Green March’s historic prominence largely comes from the international 
remembrance of the event as a peaceful demonstration that eradicated the Spanish colonial 
power from Western Sahara; however, numerous local sources defy and disprove this 
conception. In a report titled, Le Dossier du Sahara Occidental : Association des Amis de la 
république arabe sahraouie démocratique, it stated that  
“[Even before the Spanish colonizer withdrew itself, the King of Morocco had launched 
his offensive against the Sahara. The Green March, which took place in the west, hid the 
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85 Joanna Allan, "Natural Resources and Intifada: Oil, Phosphates and Resistance to Colonialism in Western 
Sahara," The Journal of North African Studies 21, no. 4 (2016): doi:10.1080/13629387.2016.1174586. 
     
 
Taheri 43 
military intervention of October 31st, 1975, where Moroccan troops were entering in the 
positions who had just been abandoned by the Spanish army.]”86 
 
This newsletter highlights the rarely mentioned Moroccan military invasion into territory of 
Western Sahara before the Green March. This invasion heavily contradicts King Hassan II’s 
speeches surrounding the March as not only was the March not peaceful, but it also was not 
directed against the Spanish colonizers, but rather the local Sahrawis. Specifically, the citation 
highlights that the invasion occurred in areas that were no longer populated by Spanish military, 
thereby intentionally seeking to combat the Front Polisario. The fact that military conflict 
occurred between the Front Polisario and the Moroccan military before the Green March 
emphasizes the Moroccan Monarchy’s goal of colonizing the territory as opposed to being 
concerned with the liberation of the indigenous people. Even more so, the Moroccan forces were 
actually combating the Sahrawis as they encountered the civilian organized Front Polisario. The 
dossier goes on to state that “[10/31/1975: Moroccan military invasion in the north east of 
Western Sahara (violent fighting at DJARIA-- FAR-SIA- HANZA)]”87 specifying that the 
invasion was centered on specific Spanish abandoned posts located in the northeast of Western 
Sahara, therefore implying that the Moroccan government knew they would come into conflict 
with the Front Polisario. This further diminishes the argument that Morocco only intervened in 
the region to stop Spain from colonizing the territory, as it is evident that Spain was not even in 
the region where Morocco invaded. The map, Fig. IX, highlights the path of the Green March in 
green arrows, with the majority of the participating Moroccan members convening at Tarfaya to 
marching to Daoura. The map also exemplifies the military invasion that occurred in the more 
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central part of the region near Haouza, Farsia, and Idiriya on October 31st, 1975. This military 
invasion coupled with the Green March served as the catalyst of intense militarized settler 
colonial policies in the region.  
An interview with Mansour corroborated the information of a covert, Moroccan military 
invasion before the Green March. He further went on to proclaim that “before the so-called 
Green March, soldiers came to Western Sahara and killed hundreds.”88  This information 
supports the dossier but also addresses the local perspective of the Green March through the 
terminology being employed to describe it. 
  
                                               
88 Mansour, interviewed by Amanda Taheri, February 16th, 2019.  
Figure IX: A map that outlines the two different invasions that occurred in Fall 1975. The Green line indicates the 
official Green March, the red line highlights the military offensive taken by the Moroccan government. 
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Throughout the interview with Mansour, he continued to refer to the events on November 
6th, 1975 as either the ‘so-called Green March’ or the Black March. This terminology 
illuminates the Sahrawi perspective of Moroccan actions as not entirely ‘peaceful.’ According to 
Mansour, Sahrawis instead refer to the event as the Black March, named after the fact that “the 
symbol of black in Sahrawi culture means the badness, evil.”89 This labeling of the March 
correlates the Moroccan invasion with the commencement of Sahrawis’ subjugation by Morocco 
instead of interpreting the invasion as an action to ward off Spanish colonizers. 
The Green March is central in both Moroccan and Sahrawi identity and memory because 
of its significant and intense rippling effects. For Sahrawis, the Green March marks the initial 
moment of settler colonialism and invasion into the territory and the subsequent refugee exodus. 
This massive exodus led to the establishment of multiple refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria. It is 
in this Southwestern province of Algeria that thousands of Sahrawis are living in exile. As 
previously noted, the forced displacement and separation of Sahrawis from their native land has 
played a central role in configuring Sahrawi identity. After the creation of makeshift refugee 
camps for Sahrawis, a newsletter reported that the Amgala camp suffered from severe napalm 
bombings,  
“The Amagla camp had been bombarded three days in a row at the end of the month of 
January. There had been battles all over the region… For a few days, the places were 
surveying the camp, then all of a sudden the planes arrived: the napalm bombs rained.  
The children, the elders were burned.”90   
Napalm bombs are an incredible cruel weapon of war that is typically associated with the horrors 
of the Vietnam War and bombings in Cambodia. Napalm can severely burn civilians due to its 
ability to “stick to the skin and melt the flesh.”91 Using Wolfe’s understanding of ‘the logic of 
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91 Nikola Budanovic, "Liquid Fire - How Napalm Was Used In The Vietnam War," War History Online, March 31, 
2017, accessed April 5, 2019, https://www.warhistoryonline.com/vietnam-war/history-napalm-vietnam-war.html.  
     
 
Taheri 46 
elimination’ the bombing of a refugee camps that poses no security threat to the Monarchy, can 
serve as an example of militarily eradicating the native and embarking on a violent settler 
colonial campaign. Additional accounts of the bombing include,  
 “…at the end of January when Moroccan planes bombed and strafed the desert refugee 
camps. Tifariti and Bir Lehlou were bombed with napalm. Other camps were subjected to 
heavy rocket and machine gun fire. An eyewitness  account of the siege of Amgala in 
January reported that Moroccan machine gunners slaughter the women and children of 
the camp as they attempted to escape the bombardment of their tents.”92  
These gruesome details emphasize the inhumanity of the Moroccan regime and undeniable fact 
that Morocco’s intention for invading Western Sahara was not to liberate the indigenous 
Sahrawis, but rather to exert physical and administrative dominance over the people and the land.  
In a documentary titled Sons of the Clouds: The Last Colony (2012) Sahrawi individuals 
recount the violence inflicted upon them and their neighbors after the Green March. A member 
of the National Union of Sahrawi Women, Fatma Mehdi, recounted, “at that time I was 7 years 
old. We were playing and suddenly we saw something. We thought it was a bird, a crow, but 
soon it began to drop bombs and everything started to burn around us.”93  The Moroccan crude 
military tactics that targeted Sahrawi civilians received very little exposure in the international 
community. Sahrawis like Fatma were fleeing Moroccan invasion and were met with violent 
bombing, a fact that is widely overlooked by the international community. In fact, a significant 
portion of the Moroccan military arms and weapons were either funded by the United States, or 
were actually U.S. weapons.94 Other international actors aided Morocco, implicating numerous 
actors in the construction of a settler colonial regime in Western Sahara.  
The Green March and the subsequent militarization of the region emphasizes the settler 
colonial goal of replacing the native and obtaining the territory, rather than taking a colonial 
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approach and subjecting the native to serve as forced laborers and subordinates. In a 
comprehensive view, all of these secretly militarized events compile the structure that Wolfe is 
indicating, a structured invasion where there are multiple affronts to alter society and the 
landscape, thereby constituting settler colonialism.  
The Green March does not only exist as a an event of the past, but rather is constantly 
living in Sahrawi and Moroccan memory, again situating it as a structure rather than a singular, 
historic event. For Moroccans, November 6th is a national holiday commemorating the Green 
March and since Morocco is administratively controlling the Occupied Territories, November 
6th is a mandated holiday in the non-Front Polisario controlled Western Sahara. An illustration 
of the Green March is printed on the 100 Dirham banknotes (Fig. X).  
 
 
The imagery on the Dirham includes multiple doves flying up above the nationalistic men 
carrying Moroccan flags, reemphasizing the ‘peaceful’ nature of the March. Sahrawis remember 
Figure X: 100 Dirham banknote remembering the Green March of 1975 
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the Green March in a similar vein as the Palestinians remember the al-Nakba where Mansour 
proclaimed “The Nakba we have here too [Western Sahara] from the Green March/ Black 
March.”95  In a broader sense, there exist many similarities in the plight of Palestinians and 
Sahrawis. Sahrawis will also always remember the Green March as the beginning of leaving 
their homeland, a mass exodus that then led to an influx of refuges and the formation of the 
camps. Mansour emphasized this when stating that “each family some members are missing, 
maybe died, maybe in refugee camps,”96  illustrating the uncertainty of Sahrawis locations and 
the disconnected nature of the territory since the Moroccan invasion.  
 
Chapter VI: The Berm 
“No one has any idea where the landmines are, there are no maps to locate them. When it’s 
raining and the rivers drain the landmines change and makes it even worse and harder to find 
them.” – Mansour 
 
Morocco has militarized the colonial space and reinforced their settler colonial power 
through the creation of the Berm. The Berm is comprised of a series of six separate walls, that 
together is approximately 2,700 kilometers long, second only to the Great Wall of China.97 
Construction on the first wall commenced in 1980 and was completed in 1982 (Fig. XI).98 The 
subsequent walls were built from 1982 until 1987 with the completion of the sixth wall. Fig. XI 
highlights the different defensive walls that were created by the Morocco army during guerilla 
warfare with the Front Polisario. Each wall slowly isolated the regions, with the sixth wall 
finalizing a concrete borderline between the Occupied Territories run by Morocco and the region 
                                               
95 Mansour, interviewed by Amanda Taheri, February 16th, 2019.  
96 Ibid.  
97 Hannah McNeish, "Western Sahara's Struggle for Freedom Cut off by a Wall," Africa | Al Jazeera, June 05, 2015, 
accessed April 4, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/05/western-sahara-struggle-freedom-cut-
wall-150528065625790.html.  
98 Figure XI  
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belonging to RASD. When referencing the Berm, most typically it is referring to the long, sixth 
wall. Composed of sand and stone, the Berm appears as an almost ‘natural’ barrier cutting 
through the arid, desert land. Fig. XII shows an aerial view of the Berm continuing into the 
horizon for thousands of miles. However, despite its seemingly unthreatening appearance, the 
sand Berm has been heavily laced with thousands of land mines, eradicating any conceptions of 
the Berm as a natural barrier. Estimates regarding the number of land mines range, with Mansour 
claiming that “10 million land mines divide Western Sahara, preventing Sahrawis to cross and 
meet.”99 It is difficult to exactly know how many land mines lace the region, but most estimates 
exceed one million. Al Jazeera has approximated that at least 2,500 individuals have been 
wounded. 100 The wall is currently the perimeter that separates the Occupied Territories from 
SADR, disconnecting Sahrawis from each other and militarizing the settler colonial space.  
The Berm is an exemplification of Theorist Lorenzo Veracini’s understanding of settler 
colonialism where the colonizer dictates who can freely move about and the Berm only allows 
the Moroccan army to fluctuate their position. In contrast to the Moroccan military, Sahrawis 
living in the Occupied Territories often find it almost impossible to get to the Tindouf camps 
safely, and many nomadic farmers have been physically harmed by loose landmines while 
herding their animals. The Berm physically carves up the territory in a way similar to how 
colonizers previously carved Africa in the Berlin Conference; arbitrarily and to the benefit of the 
colonizer for land use. An interview with Mansour explains that the Berm is not only a military 
tactic, but is also a way to subjugate and attack Sahrawis and their culture as it limits the freedom 
to practice traditional nomadic herding techniques.101 
                                               
99 Mansour, interviewed by Amanda Taheri, February 16th, 2019. 
100 Hannah McNeish, "Western Sahara's Struggle for Freedom Cut off by a Wall," Africa | Al Jazeera, June 05, 
2015, accessed April 4, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/05/western-sahara-struggle-
freedom-cut-wall-150528065625790.html. 
101 Mansour, interviewed by Amanda Taheri, February 16th, 2019. 
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The construction of the Berm and its impacts employ the tactic of colonial mapping as a 
tool of empire by declaring which regions should be handed to Morocco and which regions are 
not deemed as fruitful or necessary and therefore can be under the SADR’s domain. When 
examining the region of the Occupied Territories, it becomes clear that all of the coastline that is 
flooded with rich fishing waters and the more centrally located phosphate reserves are being 
extrapolated by Morocco, reiterating Wolfe’s proclamation that settler colonialism is about 
territory and the benefits of obtaining that territory. In general walls serve military and symbolic 
purposes as, “at times walls manifest a power that borders on the violent. They have the power to 
divide space, configure place, and create new domains. Walls are the most basic elements of 
Figure XI:  Map of Western Sahara highlighting the different time periods of wall construction on the Berm 
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architecture, but they can also be the most 
enriching.”102 The power behind the wall is 
reflected in the ability to separate indigenous 
populations and through Morocco’s military 
advantage through the use of landmines and 
military outposts throughout the region. The 
wall serves as a constant reminder of Sahrawi 
entrapment, whether it be in the refugee 
camps or in the Occupied Territories.  
The cartographic role of the Berm 
emphasizes the settler colonial infrastructure 
that Morocco is implementing. Figure XIII 
exposes a military map, highlighting the different areas that the Berm weaves in and out of and 
the military path of 
constructing the Berm. 
This map emphasizes the 
omnipresence of the 
Moroccan army in 
Western Sahara, as 
seemingly most of the 
territory has been 
traversed by Moroccan 
                                               
102 Tadao Ando, “Wall: The Time’s (sic) Building, 1984,” PERSPECTA 25, p. 211 
Figure XII: Aerial view of the Berm 
Figure VIIIIII: A map depicting Moroccan military defense lines throughout 
Western Sahara 
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military vehicles. Ultimately, the Berm is a physical assertion of Moroccan settler colonial 
dominance.   
 
Chapter VII: Similar Situations and their Application of Settler Colonial Theory 
“Do you see the Sahrawis situation as similar to Palestinians?” - Amanda 
“In some way yes, it is all about the struggle for self-determination.”- Mansour  
 
 
 Israel /Palestine is an internationally recognized site of contested nationalisms and settler 
colonialism. By the nature of these two characteristics, the territory shares many similarities with 
the situation in Western Sahara, particularly because of their experiences with colonial mapping 
practices. There are, however, fundamental differences in the conflicts, mainly the role of 
religion and the appearance of Israel as a ‘Western’ actor. Israel was official deemed a nation-
state in 1948 after the traumatic al-Nakba forced thousands of Palestinians to be displaced. Like 
the Green March, the al-Nakba continues to live in memory and identity, but also as a current 
structure of settler colonialism. Author Walid Salem proclaims that Israel is actively continuing 
the situation of the al-Nakba daily through Palestinians losing residency rights, violent attacks 
against Palestinians in Gaza, and the land confiscations. 103  This notion of the continuation of a 
structure parallels the aforementioned argument of the Green March as not being relegated to the 
past.  
Unlike the Moroccan regime, the motivator behind Israeli structures is often Zionism, a 
Jewish nationalist movement that consists in a multitude of forms: religious, political and 
cultural. Zionism aspires to create and maintain a Jewish national state in Eretz Yisrael, the land 
of Israel.104 This form of nationalism has produced a form of settler ‘indigeneity’ with regards to 
                                               
103 Walid Salem, "Apartheid, Settler Colonialism and the Palestinian State 50 Years On," Palestine-Israel Journal, 
2017, accessed April 4, 2019, http://pij.org/articles/1786.  
104 Evyatar Friesel, "Zionism and Jewish Nationalism: An Inquiry into an Ideological Relationship," Journal of 
Israeli History 25, no. 2 (2006): , accessed 2006, doi:10.1080/13531040600810276.  
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the location, meaning that Jews in Israel assert their right to be in their ‘homeland.’ Lorenzo 
Veracini identifies this form of settler colonialism as “Narrative Transfer: when ‘settlers are also 
indigenous people’ claims are made.”105 While this is a different specific form of settler 
colonialism, it is nonetheless settler colonialism, a power structure that dictates the fate of both 
Palestinians and Sahrawis.  
Through the mobilization of Zionist nationalism, settler colonial structures such as the al-
Nakba, the creation of 125-mile wall that excludes Palestinians from accessing parts of 
Jerusalem, and the militarization of the colonial space, mirror tactics of the settler colonial 
regime in Morocco. While there are apparent differences in the situations, and no two conflicts 
are mirror images, there exist clear similarities between the two conflicts.  
 Sahrawis are aware that Palestinians receive more international attention. I believe the 
reason is twofold: first that Israel/Palestine is often reduced down to a religious and ethnic battle 
between Jews and Arab Muslims and secondly, that in the international circles Israel is 
considered a ‘Western’ actor, or at least more Western than Morocco is classified as. Non-
coincidentally the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic flag (Fig. XIV) is almost identical to the 
Palestinian Flag (Fig. XV). The Palestinian flag was founded in 1948 and the flag of SADR was 
founded in 1976, both founded shortly after their traumatic exoduses occurred and the foundation 
of their resistance movements. Both flags strongly associate with the Arab Revolt flag which is 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
105 Lorenzo Veracini, Israel and settler society, London: Pluto Press, 2006, 43. 
Figure XIV: SADR Flag Figure XIV: Palestine Flag 
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associated with the Pan-Arabism movement, possibly joining these two resistance movements 
together in a collective. The SADR flag has the Islamic crest as the only addition that separates 
the territories flags apart.  
While Palestine and Western Sahara are not in replica situations, they do reflect the 
notion that a post-colonial era has not yet been achieved, and indigenous populations in the 
Middle East and North Africa are living under settler colonial regimes. Israel receives much 
more international attention and collaboration from Western actors, and it is possible that this 
difference in connectivity between American Jews and Israeli Jews influences the close 
relationship between the two countries and impacts the international awareness of Israeli and 
Palestinian actions.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The historical scope of this thesis provides a framework to analyze the current situation in 
Western Sahara where Morocco continues to maintain and reinforce structures of settler 
colonialism. Forty-four years since the Green March and Moroccan invasion, the site of Western 
Sahara still exists as a region of contested nationalisms and settler colonialism. Thousands of 
Sahrawis are either living in exile in Algeria or are living under a repressive regime, both groups 
unable to access their homeland in its pure, liberated form. My conversations with Mansour and 
his friends led me to produce this paper, as their silenced voices lack the international network to 
expose the daily discriminations and atrocities they face. Understanding the historical roots of 
the conflict can help address the present regime and the injustices conducted on this contested 
geography needs to be exposed.  
The current situation in Western Sahara can be traced to the central structural role of the 
Green March of 1975. Mansour said to me, “As a young man, belonging to the third generation 
under occupation, I could clearly see through the stories of the people I know from the 
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generations before me how their identity was effected by the Black March. I live it now as an 
indigenous man who is living as a stranger in his homeland” eloquently remarking on the active 
role the Black March (so-called Green March) has had on the past and current generations of 
Sahrawis. Mansour, like thousands of other Sahrawis, is “living as a stranger in his homeland” 
because of the settler colonial structures employed by Morocco in Western Sahara.  
The combination of colonial mapping projects, creation of the Berm, manifestations of 
nationalism, and the militarization of the colonial space have allowed Morocco to sustain its 
settler colonial regime in Western Sahara. Morocco continues to garner international support, 
financially and militaristically, to maintain these settler colonial structures, thereby implicating 
the United States and other international actors in a scheme of settler colonial actions. Due to the 
lack of international awareness, which is closely tied with the notion of non-Western actors 
participating in colonial actions, subaltern voices like Mansours are rarely expressed to 
international networks. This is an attempt to bring light to Sahrawi voices in conjuction with 
nationalism and settler colonial theory.  
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